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They share a similar origin (founded by local or regional governments, churches, welfare societies and trade unions) and common goals to promote savings and provide lending to businesses and individuals in the region. This array of goals, which encompasses social and economic development, is one of the main features of Cajas. In addition, Cajas have an ownership structure involving various stakeholders: depositors (savers), local and regional governments, founders and employees. Moreover, national and regional regulation has translated this stakeholder ownership structure into different representative structures in the governing bodies of individual Cajas. That is, the legislator has determined the power of the governments and decision-making authorities in these institutions: both the general assembly and the board of directors have substantial representation of local and regional Governments (up to a maximum of 50% of voting rights until July 2010, and from then onwards up to 40%). Within this governance framework, the need to reorganize the sector and find new efficiencies across Cajas has required the public sector to play an important role at several different levels: this is public corporate governance.
In Section II we present an overview of the Spanish state-owned banks and its governance characteristics that sets them apart from private banks. Section III presents the multi-level governance structure of Cajas and in section IV and V we examine the drivers behind the reorganization of the Spanish banking system.
II. CAJAS IN THE SPANISH BANKING INDUSTRY
As in many European countries, the Spanish banking system has two very distinct type of institutions: private banks and public savings banks. The Spanish savings banks or Cajas constitute an important network that have been increasingly competing with private banking institutions since the liberalization of the Spanish banking system in 1977 (see Figure 1 and González et. al., 2011) . Cajas are credit entities with a strong commitment to promoting savings; they focus on the development of domestic economies and small businesses by providing an extensive network of offices; and they retain an important role in financing regional economies. A trait of these savings institutions is that they are required to distribute part of their benefits in social and cultural projects. These so-called "social dividends" reflect the not-for-profit nature of Cajas, which may often conflict with value maximization goals (Illueca et al., 2009) . As García-Cestona and Surroca (2008: 583) indicate: "Spanish savings banks pursue, by law, a wide set of goals. Furthermore, given the absence of shareholders, making a profit becomes only one among several measures of success."
Another important characteristic of these Cajas concerns their links with both local governments and autonomous communities -regional governments-(their regulation itself advocates this). Local and regional governments are part of the governance structure up to a 50% as founding entities and, at the same time, regional governments are the regulators of Cajas inside their territories. The result is that "Cajas are an unusual segment of the Spanish financial sector, characterized by heavy political involvement; as a result, moves towards changing the regulation of the segment are continuously being discussed." (Cuñat & Garricano, 2009: 2) . Next, the board oversees management and defines the strategy of the organization.
The board also represents the different stakeholders, but here its membership is smaller, between 13 and 20, and its composition is not strictly proportionate to the general assembly (Melle, 1999) . The board designates the executive director and has the power to fire him or her. It is also possible for the president to be the executive director. Table 1 shows the representation structure of the boards of directors of two important Spanish Cajas. Finally, the control commission has between 5 and 15 members and its role is to monitor the board and report to the central bank. In a nutshell, this structure of representation and control induces potential conflicts of interest among the myriad stakeholders who make up the governing bodies. Seen through the lens of agency theory, these institutions exemplify a serious governance challenge. The existence of multiple stakeholders with actual governing 'voice' may generate problems in deciding valuemaximizing strategies for the Cajas. It may also generate weak internal corporate governance mechanisms, poor monitoring and lack of systems to discipline management.
III. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR: MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN SPANISH CAJAS
The OECD (2005) defines banks with public participation by national and/or regional governments as state-owned banks -such as Spanish savings banks or Cajas. This
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Given this regulatory framework, the risk of politicizing the governance of these entities has always been a source of conflict (Melle & Maroto, 1999; Azofra & Santamaría, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004; Fonseca, 2005) . Each regional government has developed ad hoc regulatory solutions to preserve the control inside their territories -for example, the maximum age at which presidents can retire, or the veto power for approval of mergers. Until July 2010, under Spanish legislation, regional governments could veto unwanted integrations.
Moreover, regional governments may use the law to distribute the benefits to social and cultural projects in their region. Historically, Cajas have been perceived as an ally for local development policies. It is often the case that key regional development projects are carried out with the financial support of the regional Caja (Melle & Maroto, 1999; Azofra & Santamaria, 2002; Fonseca, 2005) . The interplay between social-economic and political interests is a lever for these types of project. Indeed, the territorial and identity component of the Cajas has always been an important factor in their social integration and economic success. In sum, Cajas, as state-owned banks, operate within a duality of objectives: on the one hand, it seeks profit maximization as any other commercial bank; but on the other hand, it provides financial support to economic and social activities in the region it operates (Apreda, 2006 In the next section, we present the outcomes of the restructuring process due to the financial crisis. In order to do so, a process of data collection has been developed including the following sources: national regulation, regional regulations, orders of the central bank, policy makers public declarations for three years (President of Spain, ministry of economy, president of the central bank, presidents of regions and its ministers, European commissioners) and stakeholders (presidents from Cajas, Association of Cajas, unions, and think tanks).
IV. THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPANISH BANKING INDUSTRY
Cajas have had an important role in the Spanish financial system. García-Cestona and
Surroca (2008) from the union of others, a new, higher organizational entity -an umbrella-is formed. This formula allows operational integration in the form of shared services, technology and additional commercial networks. In these cases, the central bank must approve the project, and this requires the presentation of a viability plan, including synergies and cost reductions. Although the central bank prefers mergers to IPS, it recognizes that this channel allows for some cost saving, though it does not eliminate duplication of management and governance systems.
V. DOES MULTI LEVEL GOVERNANCE CONFLICT MATTER? OUTCOME OF THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM
So far we have provided evidence for multilevel governance in Cajas and we have presented the mapping of the restructuring process. In this section we examine the variables driving each type of restructuring process and the role of multilevel governance in determining the final outcome.
The hot political and economic debate on the integration process has been between two arguments that refer to the duality of Cajas' mission: first, gaining efficiency to deal with the solvency problems and second, keeping their "Social and Cultural Welfare
Project" (SCWP, or "Obra social" in Spanish). Table 3 presents the key motivations and sources of power by the different decision makers involved in the restructuring process.
The national government main goals have been to push for efficiency gains and a less politicized financial sector. It has used regulation at the national level as a means to achieve it -for example, in July 2010 a new regulation was passed that limited the voting rights of the regional and local governments from 50% to 40%, and required that a third of the board members of the resulting financial entities to be independent. In contrast, regional governments aim to maintain the economic involvement of Cajas in their regional areas and to maximize the investment in SCWP. Their sources of power are veto power, regulation and voting rights at the governing boards. How have the different motivations stemming from multilevel governance affected the outcomes of the restructuring process? We investigate whether the alliances are following a geographic proximity (within region alliances, or neighbouring regions), political proximity (the same party in the regional government) or business efficiency and diversification (out-of-region integrations). The response to the call for the integration of Cajas has been to use criteria of geographical (same region) and political proximity, giving way to a third alternative when the former is not applicable (see Table 4 ). 
INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION SCHEMES
From the 13 integration processes outlined in Table 2 (the failed process is out of the analysis), we find all the cases of mergers took place within the same region. None of the 13 integration processes took place among neighbouring regions. That is, either we find mergers within the same region or IPS across regions. In the case of the two acquisition processes we find that they are driven by political proximity since both regions are governed by the same party (PSOE). Moreover, we find that IPS are the preferred option when Cajas need to integrate beyond regional borders and there is no political proximity among the participating regions. The vertical axis in Figure 4 represents the median of the percentage of public sector representation at the board of each participating Caja. We use this measure as a proxy for the political influence regarding the decision making in the Cajas. In the horizontal axis, each number corresponds to a restructuring process, in same order as Table 2 . We find that mergers are associated with Cajas with less public representation in their boards; while most IPS are bringing together Cajas that traditionally have had a more public status.
This result fits with the framework provided in Figure 2 on the two main channels that regional government may use to exert influence. In sum, since all mergers cases have remained in the same region, regional governments will continue to use regulation as the main vehicle to exert influence. In contrast, for IPS cases across regions, it is necessary for the different regional governments to have direct representation in the governing boards.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR POLICY MAKERS
Since July 2008, the Spanish banking sector has gone through a major reorganization of its The first contribution of the paper is to provide a framework for Public Corporate
Governance. Figure 2 highlights the two main components: first, the traditional corporate governance mechanisms (via governing bodies and voting rights) and, second, the multilevel governance across public sector institutions that exert influence via regulation and monitoring.
With this framework in hand, we describe the different goals and sources of power among the three main players in the reorganization process: the regional governments, the national government and the central bank. We provide evidence for the conflict in multilevel governance which revolve around two main goals: either aiming for efficiency gains and to reconvert Cajas into non-politicized financial entities, or aiming for the maximization of Social and Cultural Welfare Projects within the regions.
Next, we provide a general picture of the reorganization of the Spanish banking system: from the initial 45 Cajas, there have been 14 integration processes resulting into 19 new financial entities. Three integration mechanisms have been used: in 15% of the cases an acquisition took place, in 46% of the cases were mergers and 39% were IPS.
It is striking to find that all mergers are within region and all IPS across regions; the acquisitions cases respond to political proximity. Regional governments have been using their sources of power within region (regulatory power and, most importantly, veto power) to defend that mergers occur among Cajas sitting inside their areas of regional influence.
When the mergers within regions have not been deemed possible, the option of the IPS or vitual merger has become the alternative. In the IPS cases, the channel to continue to exert influence in the new financial entity is via boardroom representation -since the regulation channel does not apply anymore. We find that IPS across regions take place among Cajas with high level of public representation in boards prior to the integration. This may induce similar levels of public representation in the new governing bodies of the resulting Cajas.
In sum, regional governments are using different strategies to influence the governance of the resulting Cajas: either via regulation in the cases of mergers within-region or through direct participation in governing bodies in the cases of IPS. The case of the reorganization of the Spanish financial sector is an example of Public Corporate
Governance at work -where it is necessary to include the multilevel governance of public sector institutions to the standard corporate governance mechanisms.
Finally, the case of the restructuring of the Spanish banking system may have relevant policy implications for policy makers in other countries with state-owned banksgovernment ownership of banks is a phenomenon that affects at least 80 countries around the world (La Porta et al., 2002) . In such countries, the multilevel governance issues that have arise in the Spanish case should give guidance regarding the divergence of interests among the different levels of public administration players. For instance, in our case, the Spanish government tried to spur the integration process via national regulation and it did not progress successfully given the veto power of the regional governments. Hence, policy makers should foresee the tension between goals and implementation mechanisms -i.e. the IPS formula, together with the FROB funding and the oversight of the central bank have managed to reach the desired integration outcome while encompassing the interests of all the involved parties.
